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# CIA's Blunders in Viet Nam

## Developments Show Folly of Letting Intelligence Agency Establish Policies

As the war in Viet Nam has continued, the struggle in Washington between rival groups inside the administration has grown in bitterness and intensity. There have been angry mutterings of resignation—not carried out in practice—and high words about drift and danger. Part of the tension has been caused by clashes in temperament but the central problem arises from differences over public policy.

By the middle of April, or even a few days earlier, it seemed clear to a few discerning officials in the State Department that the military struggle had begun to turn slowly yet decisively against the Communist forces.

This basic military fact has been obscured by the later political storms but the available evidence confirms this trend. Only about 10 per cent of the Communist forces, which number somewhat less than 25,000 men, comes from outside Viet Nam.

This background deserves considerable emphasis for it shows that the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency are entitled to praise for this limited achievement. As the weeks dragged on, however, it became painfully evident that both of them were guilty of shambling inaccuracies in reading the political situation in Viet Nam.

When the debate behind the scenes is made public years from now, no one will

be able to deny that the State Department, on the basis of papers and recommendations written at the time and not with the wisdom of hindsight, had a far greater insight into the true situation in Viet Nam than any other agency in the American government. Yet the State Department has faced a desperate and wearing struggle to get its view embodied in American policy.

If the final result in Viet Nam should be a defeat for the cause supported by American arms and American money, there will be a rush in this country to place the blame on the most vulnerable scapegoats. What is an easier target than the State Department?

It will be said that the State Department lost South Viet Nam just as it once lost China. That charge is wrong about China, and it certainly never can be true about Viet Nam.

The record will show that the State Department from the very beginning saw the tragic significance of the Diem government's attack on the students. It understood the moral decay and political cruelty that prompted the campaign against the Buddhists. It regretted the timid, blundering and inconsistent appeal made to the army in Viet Nam to assert its independence.

It argues now that if it is hard to find an alternative to the Diem group, the blame rests in no small part on the unfortunate alliance between

the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department with its disastrous impact in recent weeks on American policy.

In this distribution of blame, the heaviest burden falls on the CIA. The officials making these criticisms are not vindictive, nor do they have any desire to stir up a row inside the administration.

With the evidence in their hands of the incredible and garish blunders committed in a sickening sequence by the CIA, these men in the State Department would be false to their trust if they remained silent while errors of disaster steadily accumulated.

The wretched muddle in Viet Nam shows the folly and the danger of allowing the CIA to be a primary force in the development of American policy. The CIA should be an instrument for carrying out an agreed policy; it should never be the architect of policy.

Two further points should be made:

First, Ambassador Lodge, by consent of those best able to judge, is doing a first-rate job in very hard conditions.

Secondly, the action of Senator Church and some 30 other Senators in threatening to cut off aid is designed to strengthen President Kennedy in his dealings with the Diem government. It arms President Kennedy with a lever against that government if it resists necessary reforms in Viet Nam or if it flirts with a danger of neutrality.

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appropriations Committee has some sort of check on the CIA. These are members of the Appropriations Committee who tell me that is not a check at all substance.

I repeat: The Congress is checking its responsibilities in respect to the CIA. The Congress owes to the American people the placing of a clear legislative check on the CIA. The only way we can check it is to set up a congressional watchdog committee with authority and power to require from the CIA every bit of intelligence information the Congress thinks it ought to have in order to protect the operation of this system of government by checks and balances, because the alternative is the development of a creeping police state within the Government of the United States. That is developing. One cannot explain on governmental theory the unchecked power of the CIA except on the basis of the fact—and it is an ugly fact—that there is a creeping police state power developing within this democracy. It is a cancer which must be removed. The only way we can remove it is for the Congress to assume its clear constitutional duties as well as powers in respect to the CIA.

Mr. GRUNING. I could not agree more with my friend the senior Senator from Oregon. The CIA, operating in secret, as the Senator properly says, performing wholly contrary to our American traditions and our professions, is supposed to be a fact-finding Agency. It has been notably unsuccessful as a fact-finding Agency. It was wrong on Cuba. It misled us grievously with the result that Cuba has Castro and his Communist tyranny. It certainly contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It was apparently wrong on Honduras. Only 24 hours before the revolt the State Department let it be known—and presumably the State Department had access to the CIA's information—that no revolt was coming. Yet it "popped."

In addition to that, we know the CIA is far more than a fact-finding Agency. An article in the New Republic, a responsible publication, about a year ago, stated flatly that the CIA was responsible for an assassination in a Caribbean country.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The 3 minutes for which the Senator was recognized have expired.

Mr. GRUNING. Mr. President, I shall take only 1 minute more.

Mr. MANFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MANFIELD. Is the Senate operating under controlled time?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It is. The Senator from Washington [Mr. Magnuson] yielded each time as he wished to the Senator from Alaska, within his time limitation.

Mr. GRUNING. I shall need only 1 minute more.

I do not know whether that charge was true. The mere fact that a responsible publication could make the charge that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of a political leader in a Caribbean republic should have been enough to bring about a congressional investi-

gation and the kind of action I urge, which the Senator from Florida [Mr. McNamara] has proposed, and the junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. Magnuson] has heartily and correctly endorsed.

#### COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield for a minute?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Montana is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. MANFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Committee on Government Operations may be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, how much time have I under my control on the bill?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Washington has 25 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, if it is inconvenient for the Senator to yield, I am authorized to use time on this side.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Why not use 5 minutes of the time under the control of the Senator from Delaware?

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New York yields himself 5 minutes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, how much time is there?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Washington has 25 minutes. The Senator from New York yields himself 5 minutes. The Senator from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the Chair.

#### RADIO ASTRONOMY SERVICE

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, last Friday the Federal Communications Commission completed action in a rule-making proceeding of widespread public interest involving the future of the radio astronomy service. As I know, I am honored to report that the decision of the FCC would be to reserve the frequency allocation for radio astronomy for a period of 10 years, that is, until January 1, 1974.

Mr. President, radio astronomy research is a vital part of our national scientific effort to uncover some of the dark secrets of outer space, with great present and potential practical value for the U.S. space program. Around the country, indeed around the world, both publicly and privately supported radio astronomy facilities have all become stakes in an extremely important race which will be protected in a longer time

from any and all potential interference. Any action of the FCC in this regard would be a significant step toward the future progress of radio astronomy and the development of the scientific facilities which has as yet been made; and it may well be that the 10-year protection just ordered by the FCC will not prove to be a sufficient amount of protection for the long-term needs of the program.

Nevertheless, the FCC is to be commended for its recognition of the broad public interest inherent in the radio astronomy service. I know that the institutions and scientists in New York State which now maintain radio astronomy facilities or which are planning to install them in the future, together with the thousands employed by them, to mention only several, Cornell University, the Hayden Planetarium, and the General Electric Co., will welcome the FCC decision of last week.

It is my intention, however, to ask out scientific opinion in order to determine whether the action of the FCC should not be further strengthened. I certainly want to make sure that further protection should be necessary, that it will be afforded at the proper time.

#### KINGS COUNTY COUNCIL OF THE JEWISH WAR VETERANS

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, each year the Kings County Council of the Jewish War Veterans are held in hospital veterans at Kings County. For a day, the council provides activities and entertainment for these Veterans—many of whom, rarely see the outside of hospital walls.

Mr. President, the Kings County Council of the Jewish War Veterans—do not, all Americans—have not forgotten their obligation to their war veterans—who have given so much to the name of America and freedom. Because of my admiration for the activities of the Jewish War Veterans of America, I have introduced legislation in this Congress which would incorporate this association. I expect this legislation would grant Federal recognition to this organization. It is my hope that my bill will be favorably noted upon in the near future.

Mr. President, I submit the Kings County Council of the Jewish War Veterans for consideration by the House for our hospitalized veterans. I think we should give them the status of the other veterans.

#### SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, in an unprecedented move, South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States, Tran Van Chuong, resigned his post in protest to the policies of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

I ask unanimous consent of the Senate to insert in the Record an interesting article by Jack Lawrence in the Washington Post, which appeared in the Washington Post.

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

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There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**VIETNAM'S REMOVED U.S. AMBASSADOR SPEAKS FOR MORAL REFORM. Dr. Van Chung**  
(By Jack Lawrence)

In distant Saigon, where the dictators of Vietnam seem to treat the population, even the freedom of that nation, as hostages in their showdown with the United States over the regime's brutal suppression of Buddhist critics, strongman Ngo Dinh Nhu strongly gave orders to pull in the claws of his Tigerish special forces and release the hands of imprisoned demonstrators.

At that approach moment in Washington, Thap Van Chung, President Ngo Dinh Diem's former envoy to the United States and father of Vietnam's beautiful but abandoned "first lady," Madame Nhu, brought any note with a key finger and asked: "The dictators of Vietnam may be well-intentioned—at least President Ngo Dinh Diem may be—but they have the minds of medieval inquisitors."

(Madame's Name.—There are reports the Vietnamese Government is transferring gold out of the unsheltered country.)

That appeal of the Ngo family by the author of a thundering resignation message that rocked the palace foundation at Saigon August 22 indirectly describes the dilemma the U.S. Government cautiously seeks to resolve. And the dismissive speaker may be the person who leads the unidentified in searching for a way together the many elements of the opposition should Diem and his brother using the palace walls down upon themselves.

In an interview at a small house in Chery Chase, Md., where he is going to live, Chung listed the errors of the regime and gently stressed the alternatives, firmly removing himself from a starring role: "I have never been a candidate for power."

**Alternatives start**

The ineffectuality of the present regime is due to the fact that most freedom-loving Vietnamese have been forced into exile, or have been silenced or reduced to impotence in Vietnam," he said. "The alternatives are there, but they cannot reveal themselves in a country where there is no freedom of expression."

Chung's resignation was not an abrupt decision. The raiding of the pagodas and the atrocities against the Buddhist people and monks were just others.

On the subject of his possible return to Vietnam: "I would be put in a good light, instantaneously, but I would not go back. I cannot believe that I would be harmed, but I would be cut off from the rest of the world. I will be more useful here. I am going to choose freedom and stay in the United States. The people of Vietnam would not understand if I did otherwise."

**Speaks a moral issue**

"I am absolutely sure," he told me, "that unless this regime absolutely changes, there is no possibility of victory over the Communists at all. The recent events in Saigon are a revolt of the national conscience of the Vietnamese against injustice and wickedness. This is much more a moral issue than a political one."

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signs more. And we have to speak with these moral, spiritual forces. For in the end, the strength of these moral forces can cause a chain of reaction that would paralyze the Government."

It is this grave consequence that the only administration would make progress, if it is inevitable. And there is no real thought of suppressing such progress and that more.

If the United States will take the extreme measure of strongly pressing all its aid to help bring about a change in Vietnam, should Diem and his family be able to leave the country, the United States should have the policy to support them potentially, but not in practice.

When the Government of the United States, a Senate chair to Chung's speaker for the first time: "I should not speak on behalf of all, because it would stain the flag of Vietnam in the Government, but I believe that with certain give another something like a military defense a day, one can change the situation of the country."

This is Chung's analysis of the situation. "The situation was very difficult, almost impossible, because the present dictators have almost control of all material forces in Vietnam. The police and the armed forces that have been used to rule the people and to spend up the people and the people, and just under the wing."

A similar situation prevailed in Vietnam in 1955 when President Ngo Dinh Diem had against him all the material forces and behind him only the moral support of the Vietnamese people—because he represented at that time all that the Vietnamese loved. That was real national independence.

It is conceivable, therefore, that similar moral forces eventually may triumph over the police and special forces of the present regime."

Chung's personal opinions are shared widely about the United States, he says, and as the country he loves. He also about his first love—Vietnam. He speaks with a voice of his power, not merely being in Vietnam, but also to show his long career involvement in Vietnam as an ambassador, a minister without portfolio and a jurist with service on the Supreme Court. He never has belonged to a political party, and certainly not to a party that would need him.

**MR. MACDONALD.** Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Macdonald) such time as he may desire.

**EXPERIENCES OF FOREIGN BORN RESIDENTS IN UNITED STATES**

**MR. ROBERTSON.** Mr. President, this morning newspaper story that the distinguished Secretary of the Department of Housing, the building of America, which for decades has been the source of the United States' economic strength, is a source of the United States' economic strength.

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